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Warren Commission Report: Page 446« Previous | Next »

(CHAPTER VIII - The Protection of the President)

accomplish, either by his own efforts or with the cooperation of local authorities.155 The only systematic supervision of the activities of the advance agent has been that provided by a requirement that he file interim and final reports on each advance assignment. The interim report must be in the hands of the agent supervising the protective group traveling with the President long enough before his departure to apprise him of any particular problems encountered and the responsive action taken.156 Agent Lawson's interim report was received by Agent Kellerman on November 20, the day before departure on the Texas trip.157


The Secret Service has advised the Commission that no unusual precautions were taken for the Dallas trip, and that "the precautions taken for the President's trip were the usual safeguards employed on trips of this kind in the United States during the previous year."158


Special Agent in Charge Sorrels testified that the advance preparations followed on this occasion were "pretty much the same" as those followed in 1936 during a trip to Dallas by President Roosevelt, which was Sorrels' first important assignment in connection with Presidential work.159


In view of the constant change in the nature of threats to the President and the diversity of the dangers which may arise in the various cities within the United States, the Commission believes that standard procedures in use for many years and applied in all parts of the country may not be sufficient. There is, for example, no Secret- Service arrangement for evaluating before a trip particular difficulties that might be anticipated, which would bring to bear the judgment and experience of members of the White House detail other than the advance agent. Constant reevaluation of procedures, with attention to special problems and the development of instructions specific to particular trips, would be a desirable innovation.


Liaison with local law enforcement authorities.-- In the description of the important aspects of the advance preparations, there have been references to the numerous discussions between Secret Service representatives and the Dallas Police Department. The wholehearted support of these local authorities was indispensable to the Service in carrying out its duties. The Service had 28 agents participating in the Dallas visit.160 Agent Lawson's advance planning called for the deployment of almost 600 members of the Dallas Police Department, Fire Department, County Sheriff's Department, and the Texas Department of Public Safety.161 Despite this dependence on local authorities, which would be substantially the same on a visit by the President to any large city, the Secret Service did not at the time of the assassination have any established procedure governing its relationships with them.162 It had no prepared checklist of matters to be covered with local police on such visits to metropolitan areas and no written description of the role the local police were expected to perform. Discussions with the Dallas authorities and requests made of them were entirely informal.

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