400 being reviewed regularly. 28 PRS also maintains an album of photographs and descriptions of about 12 to 15 individuals who are regarded as clear risks to the President and who do not have a fixed place of residence. 29 Members of the White House detail of the Secret Service have copies of this album.30
Individuals who are regarded as dangerous to the President and who are in penal or hospital custody are listed only in the general files of PRS, but there is a system for the immediate notification of the Secret Service by the confining institution when a subject is released or escapes. 31 PRS attempts to eliminate serious risks by hospitalization or, where necessary, the prosecution of persons who have committed an offense such as threatening the President. 32 In June 1964 PRS had arrangements to be notified about the release or escape of approximately 1,000 persons. 33

In summary, at the time of the assassination PRS had received, over a 20-year period, basic information on some 50,000 cases; it had arrangements to be notified about release from confinement in roughly 1,000 cases; it had established periodic regular review of the status of 400 individuals; it regarded approximately 100 of these 400 cases as serious risks and 12 to 15 of these cases as highly dangerous risks. Members of the White House detail were expected to familiarize themselves with the descriptions and photographs of the highest risk cases. The cases subject to periodic review and the 100 or so cases in the higher risk category were filed on a geographic basis, and could conveniently be reviewed by a Secret Service agent preparing for a Presidential trip to a particular part of the country. These were the files reviewed by PRS on November 8, 1963, at the request of Special Agent Lawson, advance agent for President Kennedy's trip to Dallas.34 The general files of PRS were not indexed by geographic location and were of little use in preparing for a Presidential visit to a specific locality.

Secret Service requests to other agencies for intelligence information were no more specific than the broad and general instructions its own agents and the White House mailroom. The head of PRS testified that the Secret Service requested other agencies to provide "any and all information that they may come in contact with that would indicate danger to the President." 35 These requests were communicated in writing by the Secret Service; rather, the Service depended on the personal liaison maintained by PRS with the headquarters of the Federal intelligence agencies, particularly the FBI, and at the working level with personnel of the field offices of the various agencies.36 The Service frequently participated in the training programs of other law enforcement agencies, and agents from other agencies attended the regular Secret. Service training schools. Presidential protection was an important topic in these training programs. 37

In the absence of more specific instructions, other Federal agencies interpreted the Secret Service's informal requests to re]ate principally to overt threats to harm the President or other specific manifestations of hostility. For example, at the time of the assassination, the FBI