(Testimony of Alan H. Belmont)
Mr. Belmont.
to the country through the leak of information, classified or in some other instance where there is a question of policy or urgency it is immediately called to my attention. I can only say in general I do see many such cases.
Mr. Mccloy.
Well, we had testimony here yesterday that in a preassassination investigation of Oswald that they learned he was a defector, they had interviews with him, and then they marked the case closed.
At one stage it was reopened and then it was closed again because, as I gather it, there was no indication other than his defection that would lead to their, to the agents, feeling that this man was capable of violence or that he was a dangerous character in any sense.
I gather that whether or not he was thought to be a dangerous character or whether he was capable of violence would be settled by the man in the field office, in the office that had charge, the man who was in charge of the office that was dealing with that case locally, is that right?
Mr. Belmont.
That is a judgment that he would render, but that judgment would be passed on by our headquarters staff.
Mr. Mccloy.
Passed on by Washington?
Mr. Belmont.
Yes, indeed. In this instance by the domestic intelligence division.
Mr. Mccloy.
In this case then the decision to close that case, I am talking always about the preassassination business, was approved or tacitly approved by the Washington staff.
Mr. Belmont.
Not tacitly approved. Approved.
Mr. Mccloy.
Approved. Well, you mark the paper approved or you just accept it, accept the file with a notation "return for closing."
Mr. Belmont.
When the closing report comes to our headquarters, it is reviewed by our supervisory staff, and if we do not agree with the action then the field office is notified to continue the investigation. That is a decision of substance.
Mr. Mccloy.
Well, I can understand that but I gather when the report comes in you simply let the report lie unless you feel from your examination of it that it justified further action. You don't notify the field office, do you, that the closing of the case is approved?
Mr. Belmont.
No, Mr. McCloy. With the volume of work that we have that would be an unnecessary move.
Mr. Mccloy.
I can understand that.
Mr. Belmont.
It is, however, thoroughly understood through our service, through the system that we follow, that if that report comes in and it is reviewed and it is filed here, if there is disagreement as to the handling of the closing of the case or any other matter pertaining to the investigation, the seat of government will then go out with instructions to the field.
Mr. Mccloy.
All right.
Mr. Dulles.
Could I ask one question further on that point?
The. CHAIRMAN. Yes, indeed.
Mr. Dulles.
As I recall from the testimony of your people yesterday, with regard to the situation in Dallas and later in New Orleans, that after the case was marked closed in Dallas, there was this incident in New Orleans of the distribution of the Fair Play for Cuba pamphlets, and then a case there, a live case, an open case was started.
Now, it wasn't quite clear to me yesterday from all the testimony, I missed a bit of it, unfortunately, as to whether the opening of a new case in New Orleans, because of the new incident, would operate to reopen it or change the closed status of the case in Dallas, and the case was then transferred from New Orleans to Dallas later. If you could clear that up for us I think it would be helpful.
Mr. Belmont.
The agent, Fain at the time, who handled the case, closed the case after two interviews with Oswald, arriving at the conclusion that the purpose of our investigation of Oswald which was to determine whether he had been given an assignment by Soviet intelligence, had been served. He closed the case, as he felt there was no further action to be taken. The purpose had been satisfied. Headquarters agreed. In March 1963 Agent Hosty received information in Dallas to the effect that
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