(Testimony of Alan H. Belmont)
Mr. Belmont.
We have an emergency radio communication so that both for normal use, in the matter of expense, to reduce expenses, and for an emergency, our offices can communicate with headquarters and with each other.
The Chairman.
On your own transmission system?
Mr. Belmont.
Yes, sir; that is correct. We feel that in any type of an emergency we must, because of our heavy responsibilities----
The Chairman.
Yes.
Mr. Belmont.
Be able to communicate. As a matter of fact, during the recent disaster in Alaska, one of the few means of communication with the mainland was our radio system.
The Chairman.
Is that so?
Mr. Belmont.
And we assisted in passing messages down from Alaska.
We have a communication called AIRTEL which is simply a communication in letter form on a particular form which upon receipt is regarded as a matter of urgency and requires special handling.
So that you will understand that, in an effort to cut expenses, we determined that a matter which could not wait for a report or a letter was normally sent by teletype, which is a relatively expensive means of communication.
By sending an AIRTEL which would be recognized for special handling, the office could receive the same information by mail with a delay of perhaps 12 hours and it would still receive the urgent handling that we require for that particular thing. That is the purpose of the AIRTEL.
Mr. Stern.
I think we might turn now to a description of your role in the investigation of Lee Harvey Oswald, both before and after the assassination.
Mr. Belmont.
As the individual in charge of all investigative operations, the Lee Harvey Oswald investigation is my responsibility, the same as any other investigative case in the Bureau.
Mr. Stern.
Did you have any particular involvement that you can recall in the investigation of his case before November 22--personally?
Mr. Belmont.
No; this case was not of the importance or urgency that it was considered necessary to call to my personal attention for personal direction. You must bear in mind that during the fiscal year 1963 the FBI handled something in the nature of 636,000 investigative matters. Necessarily, then, those matters which would be called to my personal attention for personal handling would have to be on a selective basis.
Mr. Stern.
Have you been personally involved in the investigation since the assassination?
Mr. Belmont.
I have indeed.
Mr. Mccloy.
Before we get to this, how many cases of defections to the Soviet Union would you be investigating in the course of a fiscal year?
Mr. Belmont.
I couldn't give you an exact figure on that. It is our system to investigate any individual where there is information or evidence that indicates a necessity for investigation within our jurisdiction. I do know that we have investigated, and currently are investigating, defectors not only to the Soviet Union but in other areas of the world.
Mr. Mccloy.
They also would not come per se to your attention, your personal attention?
Mr. Belmont.
Depending on the case. If there is a matter which has some urgency or there is a question of policy, it would and does come to my attention, and indeed comes to the attention of Mr. Hoover.
I would not seek to give you any impression that I am not advised of many cases, I am. I am kept daily advised, as is Mr. Hoover, of all matters of policy or urgency or where there is a question of procedure. That is inherent in our system of close supervision.
Mr. Mccloy.
What I am getting at is, I think, is the matter of defection just out of its own character of such significance that it becomes a matter of out of the ordinary importance to the Bureau when you learn of it.
Mr. Belmont.
Again, Mr. McCloy, I have no way of knowing the extent to which those particular cases would be called to my attention.
As shown in the Oswald case itself, we do take cognizance of these. Immediately upon the publicity on Oswald, there was a case opened. I do know that I see many such cases and where there is an indication of possible damage
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