Mr. Rowley.

you might pick up a paper some day and read that this fellow hit somebody, and he was in to see you or wrote you letters.

Representative Ford.

Would this criteria be circulated among the 50 Governors, for example, or their staffs, so that if threats are received against a Governor, then the Governor's staff in that particular State would so notify the Secret Service?

Mr. Rowley.

It could. In this case it would be a help. But they refer all their complaints to the FBI. Threats of this kind.

Representative Ford.

The State?

Mr. Rowley.

The Governors do in most cases. So that the FBI under this system would bring it to our attention.

Mr. Dulles.

I would think, Mr. Rowley, this might be subject to misinterpretation as being rather narrower than you suggest.

Mr. Rowley.

Well, this is something--actually, we have to develop something, and we have to, if you will, have a crash program; we are working constantly to develop the categories and breakdowns as I indicated earlier.
(At this point, Senator Cooper entered the hearing room.)

Mr. Rankin.

Chief Rowley, did you supply to us the statements of the Secret Service agents who were informed about the assassination in Dallas? You gave us written statements, did you?

Mr. Rowley.

Yes.

Mr. Rankin.

I hand you Commission Exhibit No. 1024, and ask you if that is the letter of transmittal, together with the attached statements that you have just described from the various agents about the events at Dallas.

Mr. Rowley.

Yes, sir.
(The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 1024 for identification.)
(At this point, Mr. Dulles withdrew from the hearing room.)

Mr. Rankin.

Mr. Chairman, I offer in evidence Commission Exhibit No. 1024.

The Chairman.

It may be admitted.
(The document heretofore marked for identification as Commission Exhibit No. 1024, was received in evidence.)

Mr. Rankin.

I would like to inform the Commission that these are copies of the statements you already have in connection with the Secret Service report, but we wanted to make it part of the record.

The Chairman.

Very well.

Mr. Rankin.

Chief, did you write me a letter for the Commission on April 22, in which you enclosed the statements of five of your agents in regard to President Kennedy's views about agents riding on the back of the car?

Mr. Rowley.

Yes, sir.

Mr. Rankin.

I will hand you Commission Exhibit No. 1025, and ask you if that is your transmittal letter with the statements attached.
(The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 1025 for identification.)

Mr. Rankin.

Mr. Chairman, I offer in evidence Commission Exhibit No. 1025.

The Chairman.

It may be admitted.
(The document heretofore marked for identification as Commission Exhibit No. 1025, was received in evidence.)

Mr. Rankin.

Chief Rowley, I should like to have you state for the record, for the Commission, whether the action of President Kennedy in making these statements was understood by you or properly could have been understood by the agents as relieving them of any responsibility about the protection of the President.

Mr. Rowley.

No; I would not so construe that, Mr. Rankin. The agents would respond regardless of what the President said if the situation indicated a potential danger. The facilities were available to them. They had the rear steps, they would be there as a part of the screen. And immediately in the event of any emergency they would have used them.

Mr. Rankin.

Do you know why there was no one riding on the rear step at the time of the assassination?

Mr. Rowley.

From normal practice, based on my own experience over the years, I know that the agent in charge in the front or any experienced agent,