Mr. Rankin.

and might make the work of the Secret Service and others who are doing protective work more difficult.

Mr. Rowley.

Well, we have found that it is. And we always consider it as a potential threat in that it might give someone the opportunity who had plans, whether it be an individual as in this case, or a group, to select an if they knew what the route was, or conduct a reconnaissance, if you will. I have always been opposed to it, and I have always tried to prevail upon the staff of the various Presidents who might be responsible for the release, not to: release it too far in advance.

Mr. Rankin.

Could you tell the Commission what the problem is in regard?

Mr. Rowley.

Well, in this regard, it is a political thing, and the President cannot be contained in a vacuum. If he wants to go out and meet the People under our form of government, he will in his own way. Each and every President has his own thoughts and methods as it pertains to these visits, and need for publicity. This trip in Dallas was an opportunity for the people to the President, as are the trips of any President. I remember well when President Truman started his trip across the country in June 1948, the purpose being to get the feel of the people and let the people see him at the time.
And it was then, as a result of that trip, that he determined he would run for reelection. That I know of my own personal knowledge.
But these are the things that are hard in security, as far as developing a close screen on the President.

Mr. Rankin.

Is the Protective Research Section of the Secret Service under-: your direction, too?

Mr. Rowley.

Yes, sir; that is part of the White House area, sir.

Mr. Rankin.

Are you familiar with the testimony of Robert Bouck concerning that Section?

Mr. Rowley.

Yes, sir.

Mr. Rankin.

Do you know whether that accurately describes the conduct of that Section?

Mr. Rowley.

Well, at that time. The Section was established by us some 20 years ago, and primarily to process threats, obscene letters and suicide notes. Over the years, and particularly during the last 9 years, the work has evolved to a point where we find that it requires further expansion.
It had a broad and general concept in the criteria of what it needed for Presidential protection in knowing what risks were about the country.

Mr. Rankin.

Did the Secret Service have a written communication to other intelligence agencies as to the criteria for information that they sought?

Mr. Rowley.

At that time?

Mr. Rankin.

Yes; at that time.

Mr. Rowley.

No; it was more or less of an informal arrangement that we had with the agencies, as we developed the Section.

Mr. Rankin.

Will you tell the Commission what the standard was that you told the agencies you would like to have information concerning?

Mr. Rowley.

Well, if there were any threats to the President, we were interested in being informed about it. We were in touch with the FBI, the CIA and others.
In the basic schools of the Treasury, and through coordination, our agents in charge of the areas, in coordination meetings, would inform representatives of other agencies of the type of people that we were interested in, the nature of the threats that we asked that they refer to us.

Mr. Rankin.

Did you know that this standard only developed about 400 names from all over the country?

Mr. Rowley.

Yes, sir.

Mr. Rankin.

And that it produced none in the immediate Dallas vicinity?

Mr. Rowley.

That is right.

Mr. Rankin.

Now, have you done anything about that standard since the assassination?

Mr. Rowley.

Well, we have had a complete reexamination of the Protective Research Section.

Mr. Rankin.

Can you describe----