Indeed without exaggeration, one could almost say the existence of the Northern Hemisphere in this nuclear age.
So that it would be an act of rashness and madness for Soviet leaders to undertake such an action as an active policy. Because everything would have been put in jeopardy or at stake in connection with such an act.
It has not been our impression that madness has characterized the actions of the Soviet leadership in recent years.
I think also that it is relevant that people behind the Iron Curtain, including people in the Soviet Union and including officials in the Soviet Union, seemed to be deeply affected by the death of President Kennedy.
Their reactions were prompt, and I think genuine, of regret and sorrow. Mr. Khrushchev was the first to come to the Embassy to sign the book of condolences. There were tears in the streets of Moscow. Moscow Radio spent a great deal of attention to these matters.
Now they did come to premature conclusions, in my judgment, about what this event was and what it meant in terms of who might have been responsible for it--and ideological effect has crept into that.
But I had the impression that the regret was genuine and that the ordinary Soviet citizen joined with ordinary people in other parts of the world in feeling the loss of the President in a very genuine sense.

Mr. Rankin.

There has been some suggestion that possibly the leadership of the Soviet Union would not have been politically interested in the death of the President but possibly a distant wing of the Party might have been so involved. Can you give us any light on that, Mr. Secretary.

The Chairman.

By suggestion you mean rumor?

Mr. Rankin.

In the newspapers, and things of that kind, rumor.
Secretary RUSK. I haven't been able to put a rational structure behind that possibility. If there are dissident elements their primary problem is within the Soviet Union.
If these dissident elements were aiming to change the present Government of the Soviet Union or its leadership or to return to an early range of policy by the elimination of present leadership or seizure of control, I don't quite see how the elimination of the President of the United States could contribute to that
I would also suppose that in their kind of system such elements would be under pretty close supervision and surveillance and they would have limited opportunities for the kind of action that would be organized in a way in this direction, although that is a matter of some speculation.
But, I would doubt very much that such dissident elements would have a motive or very much of an opportunity. Again, I have seen no evidence pointing in that direction.

Mr. Rankin.

How could you tell us in regard to Cuba in the same general way, your opinion and knowledge of any information or credible evidence?
Secretary RUSK. Well, I would again repeat that the overriding consideration is to make every possible effort to find evidence and follow the evidence to wherever it leads.
I think it is, at least for me, more difficult to try to enter into the minds of the present leadership in Cuba than, perhaps, even of the present leadership of the Soviet Union. We have had very few contacts, as the Commission knows, with the present Government of Cuba.
But again, I have seen no evidence that seems to point in that direction.
There were some exchanges, with which the Commission is familiar, that seemed to be---seemed to come to another conclusion. But I would think that objective considerations would mean that it would be even greater madness for Castro or his government to be involved in any such enterprise than almost for anyone else, because literally the issue of war and peace would mean the issue of the existence of his regime and perhaps of his country might have been involved in that question.
We were under the impression that there was very considerable concern in Cuba as to whether they would be held responsible and what the effect of that might be on their own position and their own safety.
But I have seen no evidence that points to involvement by them, and I don't

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