The rule prevailing in denaturalization cases that the facts and the law
should be construed as far as is reasonably possible in favor of the citizen
equally applies to expatriation cases. American citizenship is not to be lightly
taken away.
This is the dominating attitude of the courts in all of these cases. We find, for example, that a group of Japanese Americans, who during the war under the stress of the relocation program, did all of the business of renouncing their citizenship and did it in the most formal kind of a way, and it was clear that they had done it and they had meant to do it and all that sort of thing. When after the war they raised the question of their citizenship status, the court held well, that the emotional stress and strain of the relocation and shock under those circumstances was such that this shouldn't be held against them. Acheson v. Murakami, 176 F. 2d 953 (9th Cir. 1949).
So the courts have gone very, very far to uphold the notion that American citizenship is not to be lightly taken away, see e.g., Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118 (1943), and that has affected not only our legal judgment in the particular case, but our general policy which you have heard explained by Mr. Snyder and Mr. McVickar.

Mr. Coleman.

Could you describe for the record what the policy of the Department is when a person appears at a foreign embassy and attempts to expatriate himself?

Mr. Dulles.

Before you answer that question may I ask a question. In your memorandum here, relating to the paragraph we have been discussing, there is a footnote that interests me. It says:
"After the assassination of President Kennedy, an official of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated to an officer of the American Embassy in Moscow that Soviet authorities had considered Oswald's application for Soviet citizenship but had decided not to approve it because Oswald seemed unstable." Mr. Coleman, do we have that in our flies?

Mr. Coleman.

Yes.

Mr. Chayes.

Yes; I think also the American Embassy officer was Ambassador Kohler?

Mr. Coleman.

It was Stoessel.

Mr. Chayes.

Oh, Stoessel, Deputy Chief of Mission.

Mr. Dulles.

The statement was made to him by an official of the Foreign Office?

Mr. Chayes.

I think he is identified in the telegram; yes.

Mr. Coleman.

Also when the Secretary appears tomorrow I think he will impart some information on what the Soviet Ambassador told him as to the reason why they refused Oswald citizenship.

Mr. Dulles.

Yes; I would rather like to put that in the record unless there is some similar reason to the one we had before.

Mr. Chayes.

Could I go off the record for Just a moment?
(Discussion off the record.)
(Mr. Coleman's last question was read back by the reporter.)

Mr. Chayes.

Well, I think the basic policy of the Department is a recognition that this is a very grave and serious and irrevocable act that can affect a person's life and does affect a person's life very fundamentally. And so the policy of the Department is to make sure that the person making the renunciation does so with full recognition of the consequences of his action, of the fact that it is a very grave act, and in such a way as to make sure that it is a completely voluntary act in every sense of the word, so that it can be shown not only to be free of any physical duress or coercion, but mental stress and things of that kind.
This is not only true because of the recognition of what it means to the individual, but also because in order to support the denaturalization in court. You have got to be able to show those things under the standards and the general attitude that I have set forth.

Mr. Coleman.

I take it your testimony is that you reviewed all of the files and looked at all of the memorandums or had it done under your direction, and your Judgment is that Oswald had not expatriated himself in 1959?

Mr. Chayes.

Yes; on the basis of the record that I have in the file.