Mr. Fain.

That would call for a conclusion, and we wouldn't discuss a matter like that with anyone, especially a relative. Mr. STERN. With any unofficial person?

Mr. Fain.

Official--that is right. Of course with my supervisor and some official who is entitled to it, but I certainly did not talk to Robert Oswald about anything like that.

Mr. Stern.

Do you have any indication from your interviews with Lee Harvey Oswald or from anything else you knew about him, from your investigation, that he was dangerous or potentially violent?

Mr. Fain.

No, sir; no, sir; if there had been any indication that he was potentially dangerous or violent or had a potential for violence, we certainly wouldn't have closed it.

Mr. Mccloy.

You felt he constituted no security risk to the United States?

Mr. Fain.

Well, we couldn't prove that he was a member of the Communist Party in Fort Worth; had no report that he was a member of the party.

Mr. Mccloy.

Quite apart from the party, from party membership, was it your conclusion that he was he did not constitute a security risk?

Mr. Fain.

I couldn't see any potential for violence.

Mr. Mccloy.

I am not talking about potential for violence. I am talking about security risk. You know what I mean by that. You are an experienced security officer.

Mr. Fain.

Well, I am suspicious of any Communist, obviously, and I think any Communist is a threat because I think they are atheistic, materialistic; I don't think they know what the truth is, and from that standpoint I would think he is--but he wasn't, we couldn't say. The checks we made were to the effect that he was not a Communist, was not a member of the Communist Party.

Mr. Mccloy.

Was not a member of the Communist Party.

Mr. Fain.

But he went to Russia. Of course, we couldn't get him to tell us why he went. We tried on two occasions. He said it was personal with him He wanted to go over there the first time, and in that first interview he said, "I don't care to relive the past."

Mr. Mccloy.

I understand that. But if you had doubts about his security, about his loyalty to the United States, or put it the other way, or if you think he might have been a security risk to the United States, should you have closed this case?

Mr. Fain.

Yes, sir; we would have closed it because there was no reason to keep it open. We had the information. We re- interviewed him, no potential for violence appearing.

Mr. Mccloy.

That isn't the test, is it, whether he can be capable of intrigue or he can be capable of espionage without violence. He could be a security risk without violence, couldn't he?

Mr. Fain.

Well, that might be, of course. Of course--if we knew then what did happen, was going to happen, we certainly wouldn't----

Mr. Mccloy.

I am not talking about hindsight. I am talking about as of that time whether in your Judgment this man was no longer, in your judgment, to be considered as a security risk to the United States. I am not trying to place any blame or criticism here. I am just trying to get the state of your mind as of the date of that report, whether that included your belief that he was not a security risk.

Mr. Fain.

Well, we like to let our reports stand for themselves, in other words on the situation, the answers given. In answer to your question, I would have been rather satisfied if he would have told me why he went over there and if he weren't so evasive.

Mr. Mccloy.

You got an impression he was evasive and he was not telling you the truth?

Mr. Fain.

Well, he was inclined to be haughty and arrogant, and even though he was insolent, and that could have been, of course, a part of his personality makeup, that type of individual.

Mr. Mccloy.

Let me ask you this: If you had felt in spite of his answers that he was a security risk, would it have been incumbent upon you to report to your superiors that he was, and that you thought he ought to be continued under surveillance?